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The line of thought presented here had its predecessors in two 
previous articles. The first, “Motivated Goodness and Unmotivated 
Perfection in Buddhist Ethics” (Anglican Theological Review, LXXI:2, 
1989), noted that in Buddhism, both Theravada and Mahayana, the 
attainment of perfection, i.e. ultimate salvation or enlightenment, is 
achieved only when the ordinary motivations to good ethical conduct 
are transcended. In Theravada, to perform some action with a definite 
goal or result in mind, is inherently tainted with samsaric impurities; 
for to desire “moral goodness” or aim at “good results,” even though 
better than intending moral evil and bad results, is still ineradicably 
poisoned with attachment to this present world, with desire for limited 
time-space “goods.” In Mahayana such desires and actions confirm 
one in self-righteousness and embody self-powered (jiriki) goodness 
(JOdo Buddhism), essentially rejecting Amida’s conditionless other- 
powered (tariki) salvation. For Zen, moralistic righteousness results in 
setting up false right/wrong, good/evil dichotomies.
The second article, “Buddhist Self-World Theory and Buddhist 
Ethics” (Eastern Buddhist, xxn No. 2, Autumn 1989), observes that in 
both Theravada and Mahayana Buddhism the portrayal of the in­
dividual self and its world as fundamentally transient and irreal has 
consistently led to a downgrading of concrete efforts to “better” the 
present world order, in the daunting knowledge that samsaric entities 
(self, world) can never be essentially or permanently improved. Thus 
Buddhism has on the whole been socially passive. There have been 
partial exceptions to this, notably Asoka. Experiencing a revulsion of 
feeling at the bloodshed occasioned by his conquest of Orissa, he em­
braced Buddhism as an individual and sought to embody some of its 
principles in his statecraft thereafter. He became the model for 
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kingship in those Southeast Asian countries touched by Buddhism, 
where sovereigns liked to think of themselves as Buddhist “universal” 
monarchs—though perhaps more in apocalyptic-political than in ge­
nuine Buddhist terms. In Tibet and Mongolia monkish-ecclesiastical 
social and political orders were set up. And numerous Chinese and 
Japanese rulers considered themselves Buddhist in a personal sense and 
favored Buddhist establishments with lavish largesse—in the hope of 
favorably influencing superhuman potencies of Buddhist persuasion.
But in the main Buddhism, as ecclesiastically organized and as in­
dividual faith and practice, has been socially and politically passive. Its 
method of evangelism, in keeping with its doctrine of nonviolence, has 
been that of adaptation to the social patterns of the lands into which it 
has spread. It has sought to change individuals rather than social pat­
terns and institutions directly, to permeate the original social values 
with its own, and to pervasively modify the existent social order rather 
than challenging it directly.
The question being raised here then is this: Given these fundamental 
perceptions of social realities and the proper way to deal with them— 
the recognition of the impossibility of fundamentally improving the 
samsaric world, the impermanence and unreality of the individual qua 
individual, the salvation-impeding nature of all action geared to sam­
saric goals—how can Buddhism of whatever lineage speak to the 
modem world and its concerns?
The question being raised here is not that of the ultimate truth or 
superiority of Buddhist individual and social ethical standards or of 
the truth/falsity of its teachings, but of the probable (possible?) effec­
tiveness of traditional Buddhist ethic(s) to deal with ethical dilemmas 
and situations in the present world order-disorder of affairs. For the 
modem world is very much of a samsarically oriented world. It is con­
cerned about such matters as hunger and deprivation, disease and 
health, situations of social inequality and injustice affecting the na­
tional and racial groups and classes, and the sexes. Certainly the cries 
which resound through the world today—calls for equality of oppor­
tunity, human rights, freedom from discrimination and oppression, 
the dignity of the individual and the like—very obviously have to do 
almost entirely with matters of samsaric impermanence which are tradi­
tionally of secondary or even tertiary importance for Buddhism. In the 
past such ills and inequalities have been attributed to the karmic results 
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of previous lives, to be patiently borne as one’s just desert, and 
meliorated by the realization that this present time-space world is not 
fully real.
To many these traditional Buddhist “solutions” to such problems, 
and Buddhist responses to modem socio-political situations, seem 
decreasingly relevant to what is going on even in traditionally Buddhist 
cultures. And the question cannot but intrude itself: Does Buddhism, 
which in past centuries showed itself marvelously adaptive to widely 
differing cultures and civilizations (Indian, Central Asian, Chinese, 
Korean, Japanese) possess the capacity to respond to the modem 
“Westernized” world with its own meaningful ethical norms? In the 
following, several of the “weaknesses” and “strengths” of Buddhism, 
as perceived by the author, will be listed and briefly discussed. There 
will be here, inevitably, some blurring of distinctions between various 
Buddhist sectarian traditions, but the main emphasis will be on the cen­
tral Buddhist viewpoints as far as possible.
Liabilities of Buddhism in Dealing with 
the Current World Ethical Concerns
1. Transcendent eternalism
As suggested earlier there is in Buddhism a general downgrading 
of the temporal-spatial world order in its scale of values. This 
order is often, so to speak, conceived to be a figment of the un­
enlightened misunderstanding of reality somewhat like the ordinary 
three-dimensional perception of time and space compared to post- 
Einsteinian space-time multidimensional “reality.” Nirvana or the Void 
is the only and ultimate Real. Dynamic historical currents and events 
are discounted and devalued, especially in some branches of Maha­
yana. The seemingly irreversible temporal order is a product of our un­
enlightened perception, nothing more; “history” has no real meaning, 
historical progression is reversible (or nonexistent), and of course histor­
ical goals are ephemeral irrealities. Such pervasive perceptions result 
in a pervasive discounting of socio-political, historical-economic con­
cerns and attempted solutions to their “problems.”
2. Unsalvability of the space-time order (samsOra)
Both in Theravada and Mahayana Buddhism attempts to change and 
radically improve contemporary socio-political orders—to “right” 
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perceived “wrongs,” to strive for justice in place of injustice and the 
like—are seen as writing on the water. Or they are the efforts of the 
(bodhisattvic) bird to put out a raging forest fire by dropping beakfuls 
of water on it. While perhaps only orthodox Marxists and some fun­
damentalists in several Western religious traditions cherish the hope of 
a permanent “fix” of the world’s problems by imminent divine in­
tervention or historical forces, most of the world’s peoples cherish 
some hope of more or less permanently ending such “wrongs” as 
slavery and ethnic oppression, wiping out some diseases, and the like— 
or at least greatly reducing them. Buddhism with its general a- or anti- 
historical instincts does not (cannot?) add much strength to such 
efforts.
3. Philosophically “idealistic” rather than “realistic”
Somewhat parallel to this, especially in Mahayana, is the tendency 
toward a kind of philosophic idealism which seems to regard mental 
states or entities as the prime realities. Whatever its true inner inter­
pretation this is what the world at large hears from it at any rate. “In­
ner” mental-spiritual states are more real-important than “outer­
physical” states and factors. And conjointly with this general position 
of emphasis on the key inwardness of reality, is the organic inclusion of 
the individual entity (also “self”) in the wholeness of reality. In the 
Hua-yen statement of this principle the atom is integral to the whole 
Buddha-nature-universe, and conversely the whole universe is “in” the 
atom—just as in a hall of mirrors every mirror reflects every other mir­
ror.
This tends to the downgrading of the individual in importance and 
reality. Quite some years ago in conversation with the late Nishitani 
Keiji I dissented somewhat from his use of a favorite Buddhist simile of 
the wave and the ocean: the wave (individual) is formed momentarily 
on the ocean’s surface (the universe), is totally composed of ocean 
water, and sinks back into it without loss. I protested that the wave did 
lose its individual form and identity when it subsided again into its 
ocean base, that some value was lost here. In reply he gave me a one- 
line Zen put-down: “Your thinking is too wave-like, not enough 
ocean-like.” The metaphysics of this aside (see later), it points to the 
reductiveness of the significance of the individual person on this scale 
of values. The question then becomes: Will this play significantly on 
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a world stage where the value of the individual is increasingly empha­
sized—at least in public statements?
A further important illustration of this: From the Buddhist (especial­
ly Mahayana) perspective, religions and humanistic doctrines that 
stress the overriding importance of the individual human being are 
criticized for being “homocentric” in their view of the universe. There 
is certainly something to be said for this objection, as will be noted 
later. But when it is said in Buddhist counterbalance that all forms of 
sentient being (sometimes even plants and stones!) are of equal 
“value” or “worth” with human beings, and when Christopher Ives in 
his unpublished doctoral thesis (A Zen Buddhist Social Ethic) writes 
that viral entities are of equal “value” and “worth” with all other be­
ings, some hard practical questions will be asked in the contemporary 
world: Should we not kill disease-bearing insects and rodents? If it is a 
human life—that of one’s own child for example—versus an animal 
life, would Buddhism not have us interfere? Ives does suggest that 
there are sometimes “practical” limitations on the application of the 
doctrine of universally equal value, but no valid ethical principle appar­
ently in opposition to it.
4. Evil is a matter of perspective
The pervasive Mahayana (especially Zen ) view of enlightenment is 
twofold: One must be enlightened oneself (an ages-long process, Zen 
perhaps excepted) before one can work effectively for other-person and 
world improvement; and true enlightenment will bring the realization 
that perhaps the world does not need improvement after all, or that the 
real improvement must be Wrought in one’s own view of the world. In 
Zen the radical change wrought by enlightenment is to behold the old 
ordinary (evil) world as newly glorious with Buddha-splendor. Thus 
Hakuin the eighteenth-century Zen master wrote: “The Buddha 
Amitayus is brilliantly manifest here and now ... All kinds of hell­
suffering ... are nothing but Amitayus Buddha’s whole body that 
shines with the color of burnished gold.”1 That is, the “cure” for the 
world’s ills is to see them less rigidly defined than in our usual 
categories of good/evil, right/wrong, pleasant/unpleasant, but all 
somehow subsumed/included in the Cosmic Buddha.




5. The doctrine of karmically determined rebirth—till the achieve­
ment of enlightenment—is almost universally held to be true, except 
perhaps among some avant-garde Zen Buddhists. This is a belief­
aside from its dubious believability for the non-Buddhist world—that 
will scarcely commend Buddhist ethics to that same world. Historically 
the doctrine of karma has tended toward social determinism and 
passivity, providing a “sanctification” of the status quo. It is today 
often urged that it is a doctrine of hope; it offers the possibility of im­
proving one’s earthly lot—the next time around—but only very limited- 
ly in this present life. But that scarcely interests the majority of the 
inhabitants of the modem world.
6. Women have been persistently downgraded in Buddhism from the 
very beginning, with only occasional exceptions. Of course Buddhism 
is not alone among religions in feminine subordination; Hinduism, 
Christianity, and Islam have also rather consistently practiced it—and 
Christianity at least has been taking its lumps from modern feminists. 
But in none of these has woman’s subordination been so early and so 
flatly stated, and so fully institutionalized as in Buddhism. Gautama 
Buddha is portrayed in the Pali Canon as having forced Ananda to 
press him three times to secure the admittance of women to the order 
of nuns. And joined with this was his dire prediction that as a result 
his Dharma would endure in its purity for only 500 years. And in 
Theravada countries generally a nun of many years must bow in 
deference and subservience to the merest shaveling monk of one day’s 
ordination. So too in most Buddhist sects it is taught that before a 
woman can attain enlightenment she must gain birth as a male. And 
even in Zen, in many ways the least tradition-bound of all Buddhisms, 
the head of a monastery is always male. While Islam seems to be ex­
periencing a revival of “fundamentalism” which keeps women encased 
in their all-concealing robes and behind the veil, in most of the rest of 
the world male dominance is being increasingly challenged.
Related to this is the Buddhist view of sexual morality. There is a 
wide range of teaching and practice here ranging from complete 
abstinence of sexual activity, either hetero- or homosexual, on the part 
of Theravada monks and nuns, to considerable Tantric liberty on the 
part of some Tibetan monks; among some of them, “come West,” this 
has meant nearly promiscuous sexual indulgence for the spiritual 
6
IS THERE A BUDDHIST ETHIC?
(male) head of meditative groups under his direction. Nor has this been 
absent among “imported” Zen masters loosed from Japanese Zen 
monastic traditions, and American converts. Richard Baker, erstwhile 
Zen rOshi, asserts that in Japan, the meditators are interested only in 
the master's “role as a teacher. If the teacher can be an agent for his 
enlightenment, he can drink or womanize or whatever. In Japan, if a 
person has the energy of four or five people, he’s allowed to have four 
or five lives, five houses, five wives, whatever comes with the territory 
of that energy.”
He goes on to say, “We don’t have that feeling. We’re anti-intellec­
tual [!] and we want to make everything [everyone’s morality?] 
alike.”2 Whether one accepts Baker’s analysis of some Zen masters' 
behavior or not, it is quite true that in the world outside Japan and 
Tibet things are different and Buddhism needs to have some stated prin­
ciples of sexual conduct.
2 Zen in America, Helen Tworkov, North Point Press, San Francisco, 1989, p. 249.
7. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Buddhism seems to have 
no really solid base for self-worth values so much prized in today’s 
world, and for championing human rights. In Theravada the “self’ is 
held to be a fabric of illusory experiences, not a true reality; it is only a 
succession of body-mind linked moments that changes every split sec­
ond. (I once had an ardent Buddhist convert suddenly ask me, “Who 
are you?” I began some sort of answer and he stopped me in mid­
sentence saying, “You have already changed a thousand times even 
before you started to answer.”) And indeed how can a “no-self* have 
any “rights” except ephemeral samsaric ones of evanescent samsaric 
character, conferred by an equally ephemeral socio-political order?
Besides there is the prospect of another rebirth which is more impor­
tant than anything which may happen or be secured in this present life. 
But curiously Buddhism, especially Theravada, by virtue of this factor 
has a strong “self’’-doctrine, fully as strong in its way or even stronger 
than much self-doctrine in the West. This is belief in the “karmic self,” 
which though embodied in an ephemeral samsaric-“self” form, car­
ries a new existence, in the form of the character-result of past lives, 
into a new existence ad infinitum. (In Burma at least this is often 
perceived as the inheritance of biological and personal characteristics.)
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But this type of “permanent” selfhood does not conduce to human 
“rights” because its only true reality is essentially impersonal karmic 
continuity-reality and its only worth its salvational (nirvanic) potentiali­
ty. In Mahayana there is the assertion of the presence of the Buddha- 
nature (reality, potentiality) in every human being (and in sentient be­
ing, tree, and rock in some versions) which logically ought to give high 
value to each individual it would seem. Yet because here too the 
individuality of each individual person (and sometimes “thing”) is a 
passing feature of this present moment of temporal existence, the 
maintenance of its individualistic dignity is not of first importance.
Of course in the early periods of the Christian West the next, eternal 
world was considered to be the only true and important one and the 
present life and its conditions only of instrumental, not intrinsic, 
significance. But even so the Christian (or Muslim for that matter) had 
only his/her present life in which to determine eternal destiny; hence in 
its eternal-instrumental quality this present life was of supreme signif­
icance, not merely one more stage in an infinitely long succession of 
stages. And with the advent of the humanistic Renaissance this pres­
ent world and life were valued for their innate qualities, not just as in­
strumental to the next life. Thus in the modem Western world, with its 
disbelief in the immortal soul, this present space-time world and one’s 
present limited (samsaric) life in it, are the basic realities. One’s present 
life, samsarically limited though it be, is the only life there is, to be 
made the most and best of. Unconsiciously drawing from the rejected 
Christian belief in the soul, and joining with it Greek-humanist 
Renaissance-Enlightenment values, “modem Western man” passion­
ately defends the inherent dignity, worth, and rights of individual 
men. And much of the non-Buddhist world has at least in its public pro­
nouncements, tacitly accepted this valuation of humanity.
This is the world mind-set with which Buddhist ethics must deal. 
What then can it, must it, say of convincing ethical interest to such a 
samsarically, individualistically-ethically oriented world?
Positive Factors
The foregoing comments may seem to suggest that there is little or 
nothing in the Buddhist traditions which may relevantly and persuasive­
ly speak to “modem” ethical concerns and valuations. This is scarcely 
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the case but it is time for Buddhism to find a “new” voice in such mat­
ters, a voice which is more than a call to retreat from a deep concern 
with the samsaric world into private, detached “eternalistic” peace and 
psychic balance. It must reinterpret its basic ethical values to deal with 
modem concerns about justice, political and humanistic values, and in­
dividual dignity and worth. Perhaps Buddhism may find that it has as 
yet unrealized capacities for such adjustment. The following items, 
from an outsider viewpoint, seem to me to be possibilities, as yet 
unrealized Buddhist strengths.
1. Organic relation of man and universe
The sense of this relationship has been, and remains, singularly weak 
in Western oriented cultures. There it is rather that of 100% exploita­
tion for the sake of man. This attitude without doubt sprang in part 
from the Judeo-Christian heritage of man’s supreme worth in God’s 
eyes: “Be fruitful and multiply, and fill the earth and subdue it; and 
have dominion over . . . every living thing” (Genesis 1:28 R.S.V.)— a 
mandate being feverishly fulfilled by a resource-devouring civilization 
and burgeoning world population.
From the beginning Buddhism has had a different viewpoint. 
Humankind has been perceived as integrally related to the natural and 
subhuman orders of being. Karmic continuity in Theravada teaching 
extends from animal, through spirit, human and divine beings to Bud- 
dhahood without essential break. In Mahayana, man’s dependence on 
and organic oneness with the natural order—from vegetation to cosmic 
Buddhahood—is central, reaching its apex perhaps in Hua-yen where, 
as in the previously noted hall-of-mirrors analogy, every being is one 
with Cosmos, and the reverse. To realize the individual’s oneness with, 
and permeation by, Cosmos—to be bone of its bone, flesh of its flesh­
does not truly diminish human worth but enhances it.
In this era of tardily rising environmental concern there is surely 
place and need for a Buddhist witness and activity on the conserva­
tionist front and a reversal of the excessive, homocentric atomism 
which now governs the world. Not only so but its sense of organic 
interconnection is of course not limited to the human-natural relation­
ships, but applies to the inter-human communal relationships and is 
needed as a counterbalance to the sheer aggressive individualism that 
characterizes Western-style culture. Surely Buddhism can (and should) 
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emphasize the interrelatedness of all men in this era of increasingly 
tribal loyalties.
2. All-embracing compassion
The Judaic, Christian, and Islamic views of human relationships— 
intermingled with Hellenic theory and Roman practice—have produced 
a somewhat strict legal moralism, emphasizing rightness and virtue, 
the role of judgmental ethical conscience in human affairs. The non- 
judgmental ideal of the Buddhist bodhisattvic wisdom and compas­
sion, which views human character and actions on an elastic and non- 
judgmental basis, and extends non-judgmental compassion to “saint” 
and “sinner” alike, violates strict legalistic definitions and seems (to 
many in the West) to dissolve all standards, and perhaps practices, of 
good and bad, right and wrong and lead to a total ethical relativism. 
But this is an inaccurate stereotyping of Mahayana Buddhism, taken 
usually out of context. Buddhist compassion as a legalistic moderative 
influence is a needed counterbalance. Buddhism needs to develop this 
theme concretely in modem contexts.
3. Non-conceptual visceral awareness
The Zen emphasis on non-intellectualized, non-conceptual aware­
ness, a selfhood built on visceral foundations has an important con­
tribution to make to modem living. In a mechanized, superficially 
intellectualized cultural atmosphere it is easy, indeed almost inevi­
table, to build a self-hood and life-style upon foundations which are 
not truly one’s own, a character and pattern of life conformed to tight 
conceptual frameworks and practiced in terms of external categories. 
This Zen “freedom” must not be interpreted, however as a sheer cry 
for totally individualistic freedom in something of a repeat of its very 
earliest (Kerouac et al.) patterns. American society at least is in need of 
the exercise of responsible, socially aware freedom.
4. A reconciling nonviolence
Buddhism has a long and relatively consistent tradition and record 
of benevolent nonviolence. True there have been some anomalies in 
Buddhist history: Sri Lankan monks urging on the sovereign to kill the 
invading, attacking forces from mainland India, since they were beasts 
or demons, not men; Zen Buddhism as the religion of the samurai war­
rior and the Pure Land (J Odo) militant IkkO sect of sixteenth century 
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Japan, etc. But these aberrations are mild and few when compared to 
the wholehearted espousal of wars—holy wars—and crusades by 
almost every other major religious faith in the world.
The actions of Thich Nhat Hahn, the Zen Vietnamese monk who 
mounted an extensive “enemy-of-neither-combatant” campaign by 
Buddhists to help, if possible, ameliorate the evils of the bitter Viet­
namese War that crippled the country for a generation to come in its 
pursuit of delusive political goals, is a fine example of Buddhist4‘social 
action” replacing its agelong social passivity. It might well make com­
mon cause with some well-chosen Gandhian nonviolent protests of the 
present day against social ills, work with Quakers for reconciliation, 
etc. all quite within its ancient tradition of benevolence.
5. Compassion/wisdom reinterpreted and restructured
It may be that Buddhist compassion needs to be reinterpreted and 
restructured in its relation to wisdom. As observed earlier these two 
between them tend to produce socio-political passivity. It should be 
said that the Buddhist wisdom-guided scepticism as to the likelihood 
of the achievement of that perfect world of the Marxist-secular, the 
evolutionary-perfectionist, Christian-humanist—and for that matter 
Maitreyan or Christian millennial Kingdoms of Peace and Per­
fection—is well justified. But the question remains: Should this then 
result in social passivity, in concentrating on rescuing individuals into 
eternal world-forgetting, world-discounting calm? Should wisdom 
paralyze compassion? If so Buddhism has little of interest to say to the 
most of the world today.
Perhaps Buddhism should reexamine the worth of those beakfuls of 
water. No, they will never put out all the fires of pain, dissatisfaction, 
wrong, injustice that blaze in the world today—or in any day. And 
few, except the above noted perfectionists of one sort or another, ex­
pect that they will. For the historical process is one of ongoing im­
balances, a kind of lurching from one set of “solutions” or rectifica­
tion of wrongs or construction of a more just social order, on to 
another. It is always repeating itself as factors change; it is something 
of a Sisyphean task. But are not these things worth doing, these bird­
beakfuls of water worth continuing? Surely some such things as human 
slavery should be outlawed; surely there are other rank inequalities and 
inhumanities of which each generation and epoch has its new variety— 
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but which must be countered.
Have words such as oppression, cruelty, torture, inhumanity no real 
meaning? Surely the words of the sixth century B.C.E. Hebrew prophet 
Micah, “And what does the Lord require of you but to do justice and 
love kindness?,” have lost neither meaning nor importance. Surely 
Buddhist compassion has depth and variety enough to learn to express 
itself in new and more active ways!
6. Personal transformation and social action
There is a pervasive strand of Buddhist teaching to the effect that 
only after enlightenment can a person truly benefit his fellows. The 
rider of the wild ox of his own untamed self, when he has trained and 
tamed the ox enters into the abode of butchers and prostitutes with 
“bliss-[healing-]bestowing hands.” This would seem to deny true 
fellow-human helpfulness to all but perfected “saints.” Or, in Pure 
Land terms, one must first attain birth in the Pure Land Paradise of 
Amida and then return in & future rebirth to help his fellows
This teaching, as well as the wisdom-compassion relationship, needs 
a new translation. Perhaps it can be put in terms of the importance of a 
deeply grounded religious awareness for the balance and success of 
social-reform efforts. Though it may not appeal much to many with the 
present activist temperament—those looking hungrily around for some 
cause to espouse, for whom means and ends are often governed by con­
siderations of expediency and immediate effectiveness, and to whom 
failure brings despair—it would ground such efforts much more secure­
ly and give a true balance to them. It is such religiously grounded (in 
the generic sense of fundamentally depth-anchored) motivations which 
tend to carry on despite any discouragement.
Conclusion
A summary question may now be asked: Can Buddhism effectively 
neutralize its weaknesses vis-k-vis the modern world and become a 
valuable and effective ethical force? There are indeed some signs of 
such development apparent as Buddhism has moved out of its tradi­
tional Asian domain into the wider world in various forms and diverse 
modes—scholarly study by Westerners, interreligious interchanges, the 
establishment of Buddhist enclaves in Europe and the Americas, and 
the growth of a considerable interest in the practice of various modes 
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of Buddhist meditation.
Nor has this interreligious contact been a one-way missionary street. 
Just as Buddhism in its travels from India to mid-Asian to East Asian 
countries was greatly modified and showed itself to be a master-adap­
tor, so too it is being affected by its contacts with and presence in the 
West. One strand of Theravada meditational teaching reaches out to 
Western young people in terms of their Western-style lives. A Thai Bud­
dhist, Sulak Sivaraksa, has been notably active in addressing current 
social problems in his own country (often at personal risk) and made 
common cause with some non-Buddhist groups to advance humani­
tarian causes. In the United States some Zen leaders have made an 
especially vigorous effort to deal with current social problems and 
ethical values, linking the Zen meditative discipline with active social 
concerns and dealing with contemporary ethical problems. Whatever 
the net result of these particular efforts, they demonstrate that it is 
possible for Buddhism to shake off its age-old social passivity and 
emerge as a significant ethical force in the West—itself changing 
markedly in the process.
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